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New Growth Theory: An Expository Device 
Preamble 
Sudliindra Nath Datta, in dedicating the first ever collec-
tion of his poems1 to Rabindra Nath Tagore, acknowledged 
a debt that he thought he was helpless to repay. I know of 
no better way to record my own indebtedness to Professor 
Mihir Rakshit than to recall that inscription. But for mv 
close association with this great scholar, I would have been a 
destitute in the world of academics. 
1 Introduction 
A Theory of Growth attempts to explain the equilibrium 
growth rate of an economy's per capita output. Formal re-
search on the determination of the equilibrium growth rate 
dates back to Roy Harrod (1939) and Evsey D. Domar (1946) 
I his theory maintained that a rate of growth that is consis-
tent with the forces of demand in a free enterprise economy 
is unlikely to match the rate of growth implied by supplv 
side considerations. Hence, an equilibrium growth rate need 
not exist except by chance. Moreover, the nonexistence of an 
equilibrium will be characterized either by excessive fluctu-
ations (Harrod), or by unrecoverable capital costs (Domar) 
Solow (1956, 1957) on the other hand, believed from empiri-
cal evidence that the rate of growth of per capita output for 
'Tdn-ni , M.C. Sarkar and Sons, Calcutta, circa 1930-31. 
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the US economy had a clearly discernible and stable trend. 
Accordingly, he concluded that the Harrod-Domar prediction 
was unduly pessimistic and offered an alternative theory to 
theirs which allowed for a growth equilibrium to exist.. He 
argued moreover that this equilibrium rate of growth (of an 
economy's per capita output) must equal the rate of techno-
logical progress. 
In Solow (1956), however, technical progress was a nebu-
lous entity, consisting of an exogenously specified growth in. 
factor productivity, resulting from unexplained causes. That 
is, Solow!s solution for the equilibrium value of the rate of 
growth of per capita output had two serious shortcomings. 
It was uncontrollable and it was arbitrary. 
Solow (1960) attempted to overcome the feature of arbi-
trariness through the device of a vintage capital model, which 
visualized the very process of capital accumulation as a vehi-
cle for technical progress. Productivity of capital goods was 
linked to their vintages, newly installed capital being more 
productive than old. Unfortunately however, the productiv-
ity differential of new machines over the old, i.e., the rate of 
technical change, was still exogenous to the model, and this, 
as Phelps (1962) demonstrated, continued to keep the equi-
librium rate of growth tethered to an arbitrary parameter. 
The second aspect, viz., uncontrollability, implied that 
neither private agents nor the state had a role to play in de-
termining the rate of steady growth for an economy,3 an un-
easy implication for policy makers in developing economies. 
Both unsatisfactory features would be removed of course 
if the model were to be able to solve for the rate of growth 
2See, for example. Denison (1974) 
3Of course, the Solow model did imply that the rate of growth was 
susceptible to purely temporary manipulations. 
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without reference to the exogenous rate of technical progress 
or, alternat ively, if the latter could be endogenised. Unfortu-
nately, there was little success for more than two decades in 
the construction of such models, except for the brief attempts 
by Arrow (1962) and Drandakis and Phelps (1906).. Thanks 
to Barro (1990), Lucas (1988), Rebelo (1991), Romer (1986/ 
1990) and others, however, there has been a recent spurt of 
interest in the subject in the shape of a New Growth The-
ory (NGT). This theory-views the equilibrium rate of growth 
of an economy as a variable whose value is determined by the 
actions of agents constituting the system. 
The present paper is a pedagogic attempt to summarize 
a few of the advances in this area. Its principal contribu-
tion is in the development of an elementary supply-demand 
framework for classifying the contributions, where the object 
of demand 'as well as supply is the the rate of growth itself. 
It is not too clear to me if.this should be viewed as a totally 
original approach, but to the best my knowledge, the matter 
has not been presented so far in these precise terms. Since 
the literature on NGT is somewhat difficult for a beginner, 
it is hoped that the simplified approach will serve as a quick 
introduction to the subject. The paper is narrow in its cov-
erage and many intersting contributions are left out of its 
purview. The reader is however urged to try and apply the 
framework of this paper to classify a few of these. Amongst 
others, a significant omission of this paper is the work on 
quality ladders due to Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
Analytically speaking, the paper concentrates only on 
equilibrium states and not on behaviour out of equilibrium.4 
Two separate issues come up in this context.'!£irst, there is 
' 'Section 4.1.3 is the only exception to this statement. 
3 
a question of the stability of equilibrium. Apart from a brief 
summary of Harrod's discussion of the problem,5 the matter 
will be avoided. In any case, not much progress has taken 
place in this respect in NGT. The second question relates to 
the "convergence controversy". It is a live issue and much 
has been written on the topic. Given the limited scope of the 
paper as well as the restrictions of space, this problem will 
not be discussed either. This is a major omission and readers 
are referred to a satisfying treatment of the subject in Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
The paper is divided into two parts. The first summa-
rizes the salient issues of Old Growth Theory. This sets up 
the background as well as an analytical framework for he 
discussion in the second section which deals entirely with the 
NGT. 
2 Old Growth Theory 
2.1 Harrod 
Harrod takes off from Keynesian macro-theory, which dealt 
with the equilibrium level of output and income Y(t) for an 
economy at a given point of time t. By contrast Harrod 
was concerned with the growth rate g of Y(t) that kept the 
economy in Keynesian equilibrium at all t. 
The condition for Y(t) to be in Keynesian equilibrium at 
t is that 
S(t) = sY(t) = I(t), C1) 
s Domar 's model is substantively different from Harrod's. But vis-a-vis 
the NGT, its message is not much different. Hence, it is left out of the 
present discussion. 
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where 5 represents the (constant) marginal and average sav-
ings propensity of households, S(t) their aggregate real sav-
ings at t and I(t) the real investment demand by business. 
This condition is equivalent to the statement that Y(t), if 
produced by the entrepreneurs and received by the house-
holds as income, will be matched by an equal level of de-
mand. In other words, entrepreneurs and households would 
be satisfied respectively with the production and income level 
Y(t) if and only if equation ( 1) is satisfied. In Keynesian 
terminology, the level of output and income satisfying ( 1) is 
known as effective demand [Keynes (1936), pp. 25]. By an 
effective demand problem, one usually refers to a shortfall 
of investment below savings at any given volume of output. 
Harrod took his cue from this idea and suggested that 
a constant rate of growth g of Y{t) would leave the en-
trepreneurs^satisfied if, along the associated growth path of 
output, ( 1) holds at each t. The link between g and ( 1) 
is provided in his theory by the entrepreneurs' investment 
demand function. At all t, this depends on their expectation 
about the rate of change Y(t) (= of Y(t), i.e., the 
expected rate of change of aggregate demand for final goods 
and services. Choosing a particularly simple representation 
of this relationship, viz., 
/(f) = = vY{t), v constant , (2) 
dt 
Harrod proved the following result: 
PROPOSITION 1 A constant rate of growth g leaves all agents 
satisfied iff g = J V 
Proof: Any constant growth rate g must equal 
5 
= m v t . 
9 ~ Y(t) Y ( t ) 
Suppose now that g = J. Then, 
S(t) = 5 y ( t ) = ^r(t) = i ( t ) . 
Hence ( 1) is satisfied at all t, so that all agents are satisfied: 
Conversely, suppose that g keeps all agents satisfied. Then, 
( 1) holds at all t Since g is the rate of growth of the econ-
omy, entrepreneurs must expect the rate of change of output 
at t to be 
Y(t) = gY(t) V t. 
Hence, using (2) , 
s y( t ) = 5 ( t ) = / ( t ) = ^ ( 0 ] Vt, (3) 
or, 
s 
9 = Z-
Q.E.D. 
Harrod referred to the rate of growth derived above as 
the warranted rate of growth, gw.6 As opposed to g», the 
rate of growth of output that would fully utilize all resources 
6In anticipation of what follows, this may be referred to as a demand 
rate of growth, since it is the rate at which output must grow in order 
that the demand for it is satisfied at all t. 
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is the natural rate of growth, gn.7 If gn > gw, an effort 
to grow at the rate gn will generate an inflationary spiral.8 
A similar argument holds if gn < J. In this case, the full 
employment growth path will lead to demand deficiency, and 
eventually, to unemployment. The important point in both 
cases is that market forces cannot be depended upon to arrest 
the destabilizing movements. 
Given that the factors that determine gn, are unrelated to 
the ones determining gw, a discrepancy between the two rates 
is normally unavoidable. Thus, Harrod predicted that a free 
enterprise system is unlikely to be characterized by sustained 
growth with full employment and price stability. 
2.2 Solow 
Solow's [Solow (1956)] interest revolves around the growth 
rate attainable in the absence of an effective demand prob-
lem. In order to abstract from the effective demand problem, 
he adopts a Walrasian rather than a Keynesian view of the 
macro-economy. There are only two perfectly substitutable 
' Th i s is the counterpart of the supply rate of growth discussed below. 
s Thus , 
implies tha t 
n m . S 
9 ~W) >v' 
I{t) = vY(t) > sY(t) = S(t). 
In other words, an excess of gn over gw leads to a state of excess demand 
for final goods and services. Since excess demand is a signal for buoyant 
markets, entrepreneurs would conclude that the ra te of growth gn is too 
small and a t tempt to grow at an even higher rate. Since gn is already the 
full employment rate, however, this will lead to inflation. 
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factors of production (capital and labour), both augmentable 
over time The household sector owns both these and derives 
its income by supplying their services i n e l a s t j ^ ^ o ^ h e ^ 
ness sector in perfectly competitive markets. I he demand 
for factor services derives from profit maximization by the 
firms. The endowment of labour at each instant of time is a 
demographic parameter, while savings, i.e., the part of final 
output not demanded as consumer goods, are invested i.e., 
used to augment the household's existing endowment of cap-
ital- Thus, as opposed to the Keynesian approach, it is the 
household that undertakes both saving and investment 
decisions. With a flexible wage-rental ratio, there is fu 11 em-
ployment of both factors, irrespective of the size of factor 
endowments. Since, by assumption, all output is demanded, 
either as consumption or as investment goods, the business 
sector is able to produce and sell any level of output in par-
ticular the full employment level, and the effective demand 
problem does not arise. 
Given this analytical abstraction, Solow goes on to solve 
for the equilibrium level of steady state growth'for a compet-
itive economy. The concept of steady state growth is defined 
as follows: 
Definition of Steady State Growth 
Steady State Growth is a dynamic state of the economy 
in which output (Y), capital (K) and consumption (C) grow 
at constant rates. 
In what follows, the Solow equilibrium will be repre-
sented as a state of balance between demand and supply 
forces, where the object of demand as well as supply is 
"a steady state growth rate" of per capita consumption. 
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It is helpful to begin with the notion of demand. Given 
that demand and supply are equal at all t, the household sec-
tor's decision consists of the allocation of aggregate output 
or income at each point of time between consumption and 
savings. As already noted, the household saves in order to 
accumulate physical capital. The latter activity is geared to-
wards achieving a desired per capita consumption flow over 
time. The household's consumption-savings decision at each 
t boils down therefore to the choice of a constant rate of 
growth of per capita consumption. This rate is the demand 
rate of gro wth. Thus, while the Keynesian effective de-
mand problem is assumed away by Solow, the notion 
of demand is not altogether absent in his framework. 
Demand for the "level" is replaced by that for a "rate 
of growth". The demand rate will be seen to be a function 
gd(r) of the real rate of interest r. Hence, it is a demand 
function for a rate of growth. 
Solow (1956) had assumed a constant savings rate, and 
hence, an ad hoc solution to the household sector's decision 
problem. Modern treatments of the subject however assume 
[in response to the dynamic optimization frameworks of Cass 
(1965) and Koopmans (1965)9] the problem to be solved op-
timally by an infinitely lived representative household pos-
sessing perfect foresight. Given the initial capital stock (KO) 
and labour force (Lq), it chooses an optimal path of con-
sumption (and hence savings) over infinite time. Typically, 
it is assumed to maximize the intertemporal welfare function 
given by 
Strictly speaking, Ramsey (1928) had anticipated them. 
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w h e r e -J- (c(t)'~° " 1) is t h e U t i l i t y f r 0 m ** ^ ^ ^ 
* 1Crt .1_0r / m it t P > 0 the discount parameter 
— 0 ( e = c o f J elasticity of marginal utility tan 
consumption.10 The household's budget at each instant is 
given by 
L(t)c(t)+K(t)=r(t)K(t)+w(t)L(t) (5) 
where * ( t ) is aggregate investment (which ^ 
h o u s e h o l d savings, for reasons 
rate of interest and u,(t) the wage rate at t ^ P 
of perfectly competitive Markets implies that r(t) and w{t) 
are parametrically given to the household. . 
The household's choice of the demand rate is given by the 
following result: 
PROPOSITION 2 The demand rate of growth of per capita 
Consumption is a monotone increasing, linearJuncUon 
of r. Specifically, it has the form g - S l ' l " 
For an informal proof of the proposition,12 assume that 
a'It) is the optimal path of per capita consumption and g its 
constant rate of growth. Suppose the househodd«Ktoto 
reduce consumption by a small unit at t„, invest the amount 
at the going rate of interest r and consume the entire p ro 
ceeds in period t,. Along the optimal path, this perturbation 
should leave the household indifferent. Thus, m terms of 
>»A utility- function involving variable elasticity of marginal utility raises 
probkms for the existence of a steady state equilibrium growth rate ,n the 
U wi« he assumed throughout tha t there 
is no physical depreciation of capital. 
i'-'A more formal proof is relegated to the appendix. 
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marginal gains and losses, c*(f)~a = = 
e{r-p-oS/i)(il-to)c*(tQ)-om Solving, the result follows. 
Fiijure 1: SOLOW. ARROW. D'AUTUME-WICHEL 
On the right hand panel of Figure 1, the curve gd(r) shows 
the demand rate of growth as a function of the rate of in-
terest. If a steady state equilibrium rate of growth of c. is 
to represent a balance between demand and supply forces, it 
must be consistent with the function gd(r). In other words, it 
must lead to a (gd,r) pair located on this curve. A necessary 
implication of this is the following Corollary to Proposition 
2. 
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C O R O L L A R Y 1 The real rate of interest associated with 
the Steady state growth path is a constant. 
lUs now possible to invoke the concept of the supply rate 
of qrowth- The supply rate is simply a — a b l e rate of 
I Z g r o w t h from supply considerations. Given the above 
toroZy. however, attention will he resected a sup-
ply rates which can sustain a constant ratomtarc* 
Technology plays a crucial role in its derivation. In Solow a 
limdel, it has the form of an aggregate production function: 
Y = F(K.AL), (6) 
where A stands for the coefficient of labour augmenting Harrod-
neutral technical progress, growing over time at a constant 
exogenously given rate i.e., 
A 
Similarly, the labour force Lit) * ^ n m e d to grow exponen-
tially at the rate n. Thus, ( 6) can be represented in per 
capita terms as 
y = f(k) (8) 
w i t h Y a n d k = K- The assumptions on F guarantee 
that f'{k) > 0 and f"(k) < 0.13 S i n c e both factors are fully 
to be imposed on / in the form of the -
called Inada conditions. These are f ( k ) - 0 as k - oo and / (A.) - oo as 
k - 0 The conditions imply unlimited diminishing returns with respect 
to each factor. 
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employed and there is no effective demand problem, it follows 
that 
Lc + K = Y = F(K, AL). 
Dividing both sides by K, 
Lc K f(k)' 
1 = 9) K K k 1 j 
It is now possible to prove the following result. 
P R O P O S I T I O N 3 The steady state supply rate of growth 
gs(r) of c is a perfectly inelastic function of r. In partic-
ular, gs(r) = p. V r. The associated steady growth rates 
of and j are also equal to p.. 
Proof. By definition, a steady state requires both ^ and 
£ to be constants. Suppose that ^ > p + n. Then, k —• 
oo and, according to the Inada conditions, r = f'(k) —• 0 
monotonically. Plence, the rate of interest r associated with 
the steady state path is not a constant. 
Now suppose that ^ < p + n. Then, k 0. The Inada 
conditions imply that r = f'(k) —> oo, so that r is once again 
not a constant. 
Thus, the only possible supply rate of growth of K is 
p + n. When K grows at this rate, k is a constant. Hence, 
r = f'(k) is a constant also. 
Going over now to ( 9), it is easy to see that if K grows 
as p + n, then so does C = Lc. Alternatively, ^ and c grow 
at the rate p. 
Further, when c. and ^ grow as p, so does j . This is seen 
by a total differentiation of ( 6) which yields 
13 
Y K „ sAL — = 7T— + (1 -7r)-T7 Y K AL 
= t t £ + ( ! -* ) ( / * + «), (10) K 
where TT and 1 - TT are respectively the shares of capital and 
labour in Since tt is a positive fraction, the result follows. 
Q.E.D. 
Whereas the rate of growth of c implies a constant value 
of k the level of the constant is not determinate. In other 
words, the same rate of growth p is realisable for any value 
of k e (0, oo) so long as the chosen k is kept fixed. Since 
competitive e q u i l i b r i u m gives r = f'(k), however, this means 
that the value of r associated with [i is also indeterminate. 
Hence, the supply rate curve is a perfectly inelastic function 
of r in the r-gs plane. As noted earlier, a growth equilibrium 
obtains when the demand and the supply rates are equal. 
This gives: 
P R O P O S I T I O N 4 The equilibrium rate of steady state growth 
of c. £ and Y are given by g* = Further, it is associ-
ated with a constant rate of interest r% a constant k = k* 
and a constant savings rate s = s* such that 
* r - p 
(ID 
and 
14 
K s*f(k*) // 4- 77 = = ——-
' I< k* 
Proof. The value of g* follows trivially. The implications 
for r and k follow from Proposition 2 and profit, maximiza-
tion. The value of s* is definitional. 
Q.E.D. 
The growth equilibrium is visualized in Figure 1 as an 
intersection of the two curves, gd(r) and £s(r).14 The unique 
solution to ( 11) is referred to as the modified golden rule 
value of k,15 The determination of k* is shown on the left 
hand panel of Figure 1. 
Analytically speaking, the economy is visualized to be at 
k* from the very beginning, no questions being asked as to 
how it ever went there. Given L(0) this constrains the initial 
value of Ji(0) to be equal k*L{0). Thus, it is being assumed 
that the economy has the required capital stock to ensure an 
instantaneous adjustment to the steady state path. 
Even though the equilibrium rate of growth is viewed as 
an intersection of a demand and a supply curve, it should be 
obvious that it is the supply side, as brought out by Propo-
sition 3, which dominates. For example, a change in the 
'"•In terms of the right hand panel of Figure 1, Harrod's theory reduces 
to the argument that both gw and gn are perfectly inelastic functions of r 
with no point in common. 
' ' T h e qualifier "modified" distinguishes the present exercise from the 
original formulation of the problem by Phelps (1961, 1965) in terms of an 
undiscounted welfare function. 
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f , , : P shifts in the demand curve, will 
I T t ^ S ^ o w t h unaffected. An increase 
H h i S , caused, say, by a tax ->1 f a l l 
t o effect the e q u i l i b r i u m rate of growth of the system. 
Tte r e i n underlying the result is to be found in the 
operation o the law of diminishing returns to the endoge-
accumulated facto. v , ^ t a , W ^ e °f the 
S ^ S 1 of capital in steady 
" be either above or below the given constant rate of 
growth of efficient labour. For, diminishing returns would 
C o r raise the marginal productivity of cap.ta, and 
the rate of interest. The latter in turn w.ll make . miposs. 
He or the rate of growth of consumption to remain steady. 
Steadv s t a t e equilibrium occurs wher. the . two factom^grow 
at the same rate. Since ^ + n is rigidly spec.fied, however 
thi can be t h e only equilibrium rate of growth of capital 
X . Moreover, given that capital has only one P - ^ 
librium rate of growth, all other rates of growth adjust to 
The rigidity of the growth rate would clearly disappear 
in the absence of diminishing returns, for in that case, the 
ate of growth of capital can be chosen by the model, inde-
pendent of exogenous considerations* Alternatively, even 
fn the p r e s e n c e of strong diminishing returns the equilib-
rium growth rate can be endogenously chosen if „ or n were 
"Rebelo (1991) offers important insight in this respect. However the 
a b i w L n l h i n s retnrns £ 
g r owth rate of capita^ ta. , + - ^ >f j J ^ ^ ^ ^ 
S X X - w e k k ' t h e equilibriun, . o w t h rate m a y no ,on 6e, 
adjust to v + n-
16 
themselves to be accorded the status of controllable rates of 
growth. One way would be to offer an interesting theory of 
technical change.1' Another route is to go for a theory of 
fertility, so that the rate of population growth is determined 
by the model.18 A third alternative is to replace labour by 
human capital and allow the latter to be endogenously accu-
mulate (through schooling, for example).19 The rest of the 
paper reports on a few of these developments. 
3 N e w Growth Theory 
3.1 Arrow: A Theory of Technical Change 
Solow (1960) represents one of the earliest attempts to the-
orize about technical progress by linking it to the process of 
capital accumulation. New investment is seen to be embodied 
in equipment having higher productivity than those installed 
earlier. The approach has both shortcomings of Solow (1956). 
First, the rate of increase in productivity being exogenous to 
the system, the equilibrium growth rate is still supply deter-
mined and uncontrollable. Secondly, the source of technical 
progress is remains unexplained. 
Arrow (1962) takes a significant step towards offering a 
theory of productivity growth, thereby endogenising the equi-
librium rate of technical progress for the economy. As far as 
this theory goes, he attributes productivity increases over 
time to learning, i.e., the accumulation of experience, on the 
part of the labour force. Experience is gathered in work-
shops while producing output with the help of machinery and 
17Arrow (1962), Romer (1990). 
l sBecker and Barro (1988). 
19Uzawa (1965), Lucas(l988), Rebelo (1991). 
equipment. Hence, technical progress amount U, tanung 
bv doing" Every new piece of equipment has to be broken 
to- so to speak thus creating room for learning.-" Since .t > 
Z the couree of machinery handling that learning takes p ace, 
A r r o w measures the index of experience by the, l of cu-
mulative gross investment (CIG) at any point of t m e As 
he viewed it, an increase in investment today ra,ses the size 
of C O from tomorrow onwards above what it would^other-
wise be thus bequeathing a more experienced and productive 
labour force to the future. In other words, techmcal change 
: in the nature of an intertemporal externalitygenerateby 
the process of capital accumulation. As .such, it has an em-
bodld form, later machines are more productive than earhcr 
" " I n what follow.,, however, a disembodied version of the 
Arrow exercise [suggested by Sheshinski (1967 J | wll1 be con-
sidered. Technical change is still an externality but it 
atemporal. An investment activity, irrespective of the firm 
t which it is located, add.s to the CIG for the ent.re economy, 
and the benefit of increased labour produ,:tMty in^the initi-
ating firm spills over to all coexisting firms.2 Thus, labour 
productivity goes up for all existing machinery, irrespective 
of their vintages. . , 
Formally speaking, the only change this introduces mthe 
20 In \ r r o w ' s words: "Each new machine put to use changes the produc-
tion environment, thereby inducing the workers to learn 
" S u s , in the presence of physical depreciation of capital, experience 
measured by the aggregate capital stock that W e i ^ ^ ^ 
absence. Arrow also offers clear reasons as to why c u m u l a t e gross ou tpu t 
i<? not a satisfactory index of learning. 
- I n concrete terms, it might help to think of labourers from.different 
organizations converging to the local pub as it were, where the> get 
chance to exchange information. 
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Solow (1956) model is in the specification of A(t), which Is 
now a function of CIG at t. In the absence of physical depre-
ciation, the latter is equal to the aggregate capital stock K(t). 
The exact functional form assumed by Arrow and Sheshinski 
is 
A(t) = K{t)a, a > 0 . (12) 
Capital accumulation has diminishing, constant or increasing 
productivity in the learning activity depending on whether 
a < 1,= 1 or, > 1 . 
The technology is therefore given by 
Y = F(KJ<°L), (13) 
where Fn < 0 and F22 < 0, so that there are diminishing 
returns to K (if the spillover in the form of Ka is ignored) 
and K°L as a whole. Also, the function F displays constant 
returns to scale in K and I f X . 2 3 But, the returns to scale 
in K and L are increasing. The increasing returns being 
external.to the firm, however, the equilibrium for the system 
is still sustainable by Solow type competitive markets. 
The interesting change now, as compared to the Solow for-
mulation, is that the social marginal productivity of capital 
= + (1 — a)f ' (k), is strictly greater than its private 
marginal product F\ = f'(k). A private producer, in com-
puting the profitability of an additional dose of capital, will 
be ignoring the gain it generates for other producers.2 ' Also, 
23As before, the function may be expressed in the form ( 8), with no 
change in the definitions of y and k. The properties of f(k) remain unal-
tered too vis-a-vis the variable k. 
24Intuitively speaking, the productive sector may be imagined to be 
made up of M identical firms, each producing F ( j j , K a j j ) . Under con-
19 
while the private marginal productivity of capital is dimin-
ng (i e Fn < 0), this may not be the case for ,ts social 
mar^nai productivity. This is evident from the expression 
for average social productivity of capital 
L^FihJT-'L) (14) 
which decreases, remains constant or increases according as 
r < - or > W h e n a < l > t h G d i m i m s h m f S°C! 
marginal productivity of K is traceable (as in Solow) to the 
existence of the exogenously accumulating factor labour, 
Ms case, the equilibrium rate of growth is strongly influenced 
bv the rate of population growth, though the expression for it 
is less obvious than in Solow. In fact, the equilibrium rate of 
growth of efficient labour is now a blend as it were of an en-
dogenous factor, viz., the rate of growth of l e a r n i n g which « 
a function of the rate of capital accumulation, and the exoge-
nous population growth rate. Thus, while the rate of capital 
growth is determined by the rate of growth of efficient labour 
the latter is itself influenced by the former Asa result the 
equilibrium rates of growth of capital and efficient labour 
are solutions to a pair of simultaneous equations and hence 
endogenously d e t e r m i n e d . However, to the extent that the 
exogenous rate of population growth continues to influence 
the steady state growth rate, the case 0 < 1 can only be a 
partial solution to the Solow problem. This shows up in the 
stantTreturns, this means tha~t aggregate production is given.by ( 13). An 
increase in 4 in all firms brings about a corresponding rise in K, but each 
firm ^ . n g negligibly small, is aware only of the change m i t . own capita 
s toci Hence, ft does not tak'e into account the effect of the sooal marginal 
productivity of the change in the private capital stock. 
' - I n other words, the increasing returns to A' and L is not strong enough 
to counter the dampening effect of an exogenously growing labour force. 
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fact that while the rate of growth is no longer unexplained, 
it is still uncontrollable. 
As can be easily surmised, however, the exogenous rate 
of population growth ceases to play a role when a > 1, for 
now there are no diminishing returns to capital accumula-
tion. Full-fledged theories of endogenous growth result in the 
process. 
The discussion that follows will be divided up into three 
parts, corresponding to a < 1, = 1 or, >1 . 
3.1.1 a < 1 
In Solow, the position of gs is determined by //, while p is 
itself exogenously specified. The important progress made by 
Arrow's theory of technical change is to set up a simultaneous 
equation system whose solution determines the position of gs. 
Figure 1 represens Arrow's equilibrium also, but the value of 
H is now specifiable in terms of other parameters of the model. 
This is the content of the next result. 
P R O P O S I T I O N 5 The equilibrium rate of growth for an 
economy with learning is given by // = 
Proof. The principle of determination of equilibrium growth 
rate is the same as in Proposition 4. The only difference lies 
in the determination of the supply rate of growth, which is 
now endogenous. Proposition 3 and equation ( 12) imply 
that 
K 
and 
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= a-
Solving 
K 
K" 
nne these simultaneous equations in and f , 
A' _ (15) 
fissCtK" l - o 
A' n 
K 1 - a 
Q.E.D. 
The unique solution value ft is determined by the principle 
hi, conclusions were nevertheless disappointing msofar as they 
S o suggest how policy prescriptions or perturbations in 
preference parameters might influence the growth rate. 
P There is a role for policy in Arrow's model however even if 
the mie c/ growth cannot be affected. As already noted, p r , 
™ e t repLeurs tend to underestimate the 
productivity of capital by its private marginal product, t is 
^he latter J d not the former that is equated to the real rate o 
nte est o'profit maidmization. This leads to a suboptimal 
allocation of resources and the competitive equihbrmmft* 
to be a social optimum. To appreciate the nature of market 
failure implied by the Arrow model the equilibrium of the 
private enterprise economy needs to be compared with that 
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of a command economy where the allocation of resources is 
carried out by an omniscient planner. The latter is endowed 
with exactly the same welfare function ( 4) as the representa-
tive household, but unlike private agents, takes into account 
the social productivity of capital. Although this has no effect 
on the equinorium rate of growth, it shows up as a smaller 
modified golden rule value of A; in a market equilibrium as 
compared to the social optimum. This is the content of the 
next result. 
P R O P O S I T I O N 6 The equilibrium value k* of k in a com-
petitive economy is strictly less than its equilibrium value 
k** in a comm.and economy. 
As in the case of Proposition 2, the formal proof of this 
proposition is left for the Appendix. Informally, the argument 
rests on the observation that the command economy replaces 
the rate of interest r in Proposition 2 by the social marginal 
productivity of capital Q^p- + (1 — a)f'(k). Equating this to 
the expression for gs. given by Proposition 5, k** satisfies 
k 1 - a 
On the other hand, the market economy equates r to f'(k) 
with the result that the same sequence of arguments gives 
,„,,. na 
f'(k*) = p+- a. 
1 — a 
The proposition now follows from the strict concavity of f(k). 
As already noted, Proposition 6 creates room for policy 
intervention to improve upon the competitive solution. Since 
the increase in wages resulting from improved labour produc-
tivity is traceable to capital which receives less than its true 
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marginal product in a competitive equilibrium the obvious 
policy implication is to tax wage income (which leaves the 
inelastic labour supply unaffected) and subsidise capital. 
Apart from the^quilibrium rate of growth turning out to 
be impervious to policy manipulations, a second major short-
coming of the Arrow theory is that technical progress, though 
endogenous^ generated, is viewed as an inevitable (or un-
avoidable) byproduct of the process of capital accumulation. 
I, is not linked to the deliberate actions of economic agents 
who are known in real life to innovate in search of higher 
profits from production. 
The major difficulty of treating technical change as a 
choice variable of the model stems from the fact that it is 
not a marketable commodity. It is, in fact, both nonnval as 
well as nonexcludable, i.e., it is a pure public good. For ex-
ample. in the Arrow-Sheshinski model, it is nonnval since all 
firms enjoy it simultaneously; and it is nonexcludable, since 
it has the form of an external effect. This is an important 
issue addressed by Romer (1930). 
3 . 1 . 2 A - 1 
Arrow did not consider this case in depth, but it has a rather 
interesting feature as a recent study by d'Autume and Michel 
(1993) indicates. For this specification of the parameter a, 
the Arrow production function is globally linear in capital. As 
a result, it has two of the features (viz., linearity and a theory 
of technical change) outlined at the end of Section 2 which 
can lead to an endogenous determination of the equilibrium 
rate of growth.26 For the sake of continuity, the neoclassical 
- I t g o e s without saying that any one of these featnres would have been 
sufficient. Of course, in Arrow they are not separable from each other. 
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framework will be maintained, although the original results 
were presented in Arrow's embodied form. 
Following the steps of Proposition 3, it must still be true 
that 
k 
K = /i + n 
= - + n , a = 1. (16) 
However, this can happen only if n = 0. Thus, in the present 
model, a necessary condition for the existence of an equilib-
rium growth rate is a stationary level of population, i.e., L 
must be a constant, say L. As opposed to Proposition 5, cap-
ital K and efficiency labour KL must have no choice but to 
grow at a common rate in this model and diminishing returns 
does not have a chance to operate. Thus, there is no supply 
mechanism to nail down the equilibrium rate of growth . In 
fact, the supply rate curve is completely missing. The equi-
librium rate of growth is nevertheless determinate, since ( 16) 
implies a stationary value for fc, which, by definition, equals 
fc* = l /L . Consequently, ( 11) admits a unique profit max-
imizing value of r, viz., r* = f ' ( l / L ) . Finally, Proposition 
2 determines g* = As can be seen, a change in p and 
cr would now have an effect on the growth rate. So would 
policy, such as a tax on interest income. The conclusions are 
summarized below. 
P R O P O S I T I O N 7 When a = 1 , equilibrium growth implies 
L = L = constant. Further, the rate of equilibrium 
growth of c, f and £ is where r* = / ^ ( j ) . A 
change in pr-eference parameters affects the growth rate, 
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• 1he size of the labour force affects 
Me a change m as well as the modi-
both the growth rate (througn j 
fied golden rule value of k. 
I t m a y be noted that while the 
l o„ger tied to the latter dcter-
pend on the and hence the equilil> 
mines the equilibrium rate o demonstrates 
r r ^ " r r i S u U u r n . 
the nature ot this aerruinu account 
Once a g a i n the conimand a n d t h i s 
the externality fector ^ ' ' * u e A c c o r d e d to the social 
shows up in the form of a higher value h e m arket 
— £ S n t ^ c a n be rewritten 
m , L ) and equals the social ^ ^ " U m a f d 
a result, the equilibrium rate of growth lor 
economy is 
3 = o 
Hence, the following proposition emerges: 
P R O P O S I T I O N 8 The equilibrium value g* of the rate of 
I Z ^ a market economy is strictly less than Us equi-
librium value g" in a command economy. 
a to thP rase a < 1, it is now the rate of growth that 
S t r e — d economy and not the e.uilibrium 
Val7n°the d'Autume and Michel work, the rate of,population 
growth takes a back seat in the explanation of the rate of 
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growth of the economy. This feature will be shared by the 
remaining models to be discussed also, though, as opposed to 
d'Autume and Michel, they do not have a logical need to as-
sume the rate to be zero. Nevertheless, since the exogenous 
rate of population growth has no analytical significance 
in the next few models, it will henceforth be assumed to 
be identically zero without any loss of generality. 
3.1.3 a > l 
Given the objective of the paper outlined in the Introduc-
tion, this case represents a detour. First, it does not permit 
the system to be in steady equilibrium. The steady state is 
where the economy tends over time. As such, the entire anal-
ysis is restricted to out of steady state behaviour. Secondly, 
the model is an effort, to explain why poor as well as rich 
countries may display similar rates of growth, a phenomenon 
that the simple Solow model would not predict, since dimin-
ishing returns (or, capital saturation) should imply a lower 
out of steady state growth rate for economies with a higher 
per capita output. This part of the discussion falls within the 
purview of the "convergence question". 
Both issues are beyond the scope of the paper. Never-
theless, a brief treatment is offered to round up the issues 
raised by the Arrow formulation of technical progress. It 
must be remembered of course that Arrow had ignored the 
case a > 1 altogether. On the other hand, it is Romer's 
[Romer (1986)] earliest attempt to tackle the Solow problem. 
Romer calls for a distinction between physical and knowledge 
capital. Unlike Arrow, it is the accumulation of knowledge 
rather than physical capital that contributes to an increase 
in labour productivity. In the changed scenario, I stands for 
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4. K for the stock of knowledge capital, physical investment and K for he sto o f 
being equal to investment, 
I = F(K, KaL) - C. 
On the other hand, "new" k n o w l e d g e capital ^ ^ I Z 
duced through the application of physical investment and the 
eni Ire stock of knowledge capital by means of a linear homo-
geneous production function G(I,K). In other word,, 
k = G(I,K)=Kg(±)- <17) 
where g(j^) = 1)- moment, simul-
The fact that the entire quantum of K B present sin u 
taneously in both F and G indicates that it .s bemg vr wrf 
i r n o n r i v a l good.- Amongst other things, t h e - c o 
such a factor calls for a careful cons.derat.on of the market 
structn e for it is not entirely clear that a c o m p e t e mar-
ket structure can sustain the growth path any longer. Indeed, 
i f t h final output [i.e., F{, .)] is produced in a competrtrve 
market, then / " a n d K'L are paid their respective marg, 1 
, 1 /: 0 jr. 9 - 1 2) and this exhausts the total out-
* i s n o t . P , d * * * * 
production of "new" knowledge. A plausible^ story may be 
that the production of C + / is a market oriented activity, 
whi l accumulation of K is an activity internal to the h - . 
hold. The latter invokes the nonrival input K as well as the 
productive consumption of the rival good I . 
^The~concept\ial implicTdon of this is brought out in great detail in 
Romer (1990), though this paper does not deal with a generalization of 
A r r o w . 
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The rate of growth of efficiency labour is 
Hence, k -+ 0 and ^ oo. Writing ( 17) as 
it follows that ^ oo if 5 is bounded away from zero. 
Romer assumes that 
<?(•) < 9, an exogenously specified bound . 
The rate of growth of knowledge capital is bounded above 
by g however high may be the ratio As a result, ( 9) 
implies that £ diverges as f approaches g. Similarly, the 
rate of growth of efficiency labour approaches ag and £ lies 
trapped over time between 7rg + (1 - t t ) | ^ . To summarize: 
P R O P O S I T I O N 9 When a = 1, the economy is never in 
steady state equilibrium. Under the assumption that the 
rate of growth of knowledge capital is a bounded function 
of the ratio of physical investment to knowledge capital, 
K and efficiency labour KQL grow at constant, though 
not equal rates. 
It goes without saying that there would once again be 
a difference between the market and the command economy 
and this would show up in the paths of capital accumulation. 
As already noted, the model provides an explanation for 
the often observed phenomenon that a rich and a poor econ-
omy exhibit the same rate of growth in spite of wide diver-
gences between the levels of per capita variables. In fact, 
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/ 
, „0 rWarterizine; the model implies that the increasing return, characteming inagnified 
initial discrepancies m per ^ ^ ^ ^ c o n v e r g e . 
over time at the same time that the rates 01 & 
Thus, 
Ut) = Kt(o)e*® 
and 
K,(t) = K,(0)esM, 
where I and . stand respectively for the large and small coun-
wnere i anu f ( n = £ > 0 , it is easy to show that 
tries. Writing Ki(0) - »sl,ui , \ „ 
K,(t) - KM) - oo when 71M - W> " u ' 
3.2 Rebelo: The Role of a Linear Technology 
The d ' A u t u m e - M i c h e l model can be viewed as asp«iaJ[in-
stance of a general insight provided by Rebelo (1991) that 
the equilibrium rate of growth stays delinked from exogenous 
factors even in the presence of diminishing returns, so long as 
the latter is r e s t r i c t e d to sectors other than the one producing 
capital ^ goods. ^ ^ ^ ^ 
into a reproducible and a nonreproducible28 ? oup , say, A and 
L The former is a composite of physical and human capital, 
whiTe the latter may be called land. Growth in the labour 
force is now replaced by a growth in human capital, but the 
4s will be s e c below, iTis not so much the nonreproducibiUtyoflhc 
factors as the exog.ne.t , of the rules governing then dynamics that is 
analytically important. 
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latter is endogenous.29 There are two sectors producing re-
spectively an investment good (/) and a consumption good 
(C). In the absence of labour growth, per capita consump-
tion c. is identical with C. The investment good is produced 
by a non-sector specific (though rival) capital good (K) using 
a linear technology 
/ = A(1 — 4)Kt (18) 
where A is a technological constant, (f> the endogenously de-
termined share of existing capital used in producing / and. 
by definition, I = K. The consumption good is produced by 
a Cobb-Douglas technology using K and the nonreproducible 
factor L: 
C = B(4>K)° Ll~a, (19) 
where B is a constant. 
A decision to save is a decision to abstain from consump-
tion, and this, in a standard one sector model, amounts to a 
simple one-to-one diversion of a part of the output towards 
capital formation. In the present two sector framework, the 
consumption- savings choice is a more complicated problem 
and amounts to a decision to produce less of C by diverting 
a larger fraction of K to the production of I. Keeping this 
interpretation of savings in mind, the demand rate of growth 
<?c C is given by Proposition 2, with r replaced by rc, the 
real rate of interest in units of the consumption good. Thus, 
23In the linear version of the model considered by Rebelo, human and 
physical capita] are inseparable. A separation is possible in his nonlinear 
version of the problem. However, this part of the Rebelo exercise will 
be discussed in the next section as an extension of Lucas (1988), since the 
source of growth is not traceable here to an absence of diminishing returns. 
31 
r ^ h fe known once the equilibrium 
T H R U F B R I U , : O W L G T n THE " Z e e of ( 19) , i . e . , if t h e value of re » solvedfor. In t e c h n o l o g y , profit 
m 0del - f Id equate the real rate of in-
m a x i m i z i n g e n t r e p r e n e u t h e e q u i . 
terest to the margma product A of cap a n d 
librium rate of growth a n aggregate 
S T L t ^ ' h o w e v e r , the inv.trae.rt ^ t o r r e p r e -
' ,S, r ; t».e Tsector (somewhat like Ricardo's corn rate 
T * r T h t ra ^ growth is a constant given a constant 
t * But a constant 
- E T I S S e C o f capital r e l a t e to 
dtover time This follows because a market equihbnum 
to o « h no arbitrage condition that capital be a.located 
between the two sectors so that the (value of) rts margmal 
product be equal in the two sectors, i.e., 
pA = aB(tK)°-lLl-° (20) 
^ T ^ i ^ m p o s a b l c ' has the same connotation as in 
input-output theory. 
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s. 
Hence, 
9P = ^ = ( a - 1 )gk, (21) 
where, according to ( 18), the rate of growth of capital satis-
fies 
k 9k = -E=A{l- 4>). 
Similarly, ( 19) implies that gc, the rate of growth of C, sat-
isfies 
9c = agk. (22) 
Thus, gc < gk,31 
Finally, a second no arbitrage condition ensures that the 
rate of interest for consumption good denominated loans (rc) 
is the same as that in capital good denominated loans (rk) 
corrected for the rate of change of the relative price (gp): 
rc = rk+gp. (23) 
Replacing rk in ( 23) by the marginal productivity of capital 
in the I sector and using in succession (21) and ( 22), it is 
possible to derive the supply rate of growth of C as a function 
of the rate of interest rc: 
31 This is obvious from the relation 
J ^ W ^ ) 1 " * . 
since L is a constant. While gc < gk, both are strictly positive under Re-
belo's assumptions. However, for production functions reaching saturation 
at finite K, the positivity of gc cannot be retained in the face of steady 
growth in K. 
33 
gsc(rc) = 
a(A - rc) 
1 - a 
(24) 
Unlike the supply function in Arrow, the Rebelo function is 
not perfectly inelastic and it is now possible to say that both 
demand and supply have a role to play in determining the 
equilibrium rate of growth gfc. 
Piijurc 2: REBELO 
Once the latter is known, ( 22) determines g*k also. Thus, 
, = a { A - p ) 
9 c 1 - a ( l - a) 
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** l - a ( l - < 7 ) " 
The diagram confirms the condition for positive rate of growth, 
viz., A > p. Writing Y = C + pI, the equilibrium rate of 
growth of Y is easily seen to be g*y gc = agk. The ap-
pearance of preference parameters in the expressions for g*c 
etc. indicates that savings behaviour plays an important role 
in determining the equilibrium rate of growth. As in the 
d'Autume and Michel case, a tax on income, by affecting the 
saving rate, will have an impact on the growth rate.32 
Rebelo's results therefore yield the following Proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1 0 Even in the presence of strong dimin-
ishing returns in parts of the economy, steady state cap-
ital accumulation is possible at an endogenously chosen 
rate so long as there is an indecomposable subsector of 
the economy which produces capital goods by using cap-
ital goods alone. All other sectors into which the capital 
good enters as an input and where production is car-
ried out under diminishing returns, adjust to this rate of 
growth through a continuous fall in the relative price of 
capital goods. 
3 2 I t is of some interest t o note here tha t the Rebelo storv will remain 
valid even when L grows at an exogenous!}' specified rate n > 0. Exactly 
the same sequence of a rguments can be used to show tha t 
9c = 
9k = 
a(A+^n-p) 
1 — a(l — u) 
[A+^n-p) 
1 — a(l — a) 
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In interpreting K as a composite of human and nonhu-
man capital, Rebelo is in a way offering a theory of technical 
change. Any tendency for diminishing returns to physical 
capital is being reversed by the rise in productivity on ac-
count of human capital growth, giving rise to constant re-
turns in the / sector. As a theory of technical change this 
is rather vague in comparison to Arrow's, or for that matter 
Rebelo's own extension of Lucas' model. Strictly speaking, it 
is the constant returns technology that is at the heart of the 
result and it does not seem fruitful to read any more meaning 
into it. 
3,3 Lucas, Rebe lo and Uzawa: Technical 
Progress as Format ion of H u m a n Capita l 
Lucas (1988) follows Uzawa (1965) in tracing the increase 
in labour efficiency to a conscious attempt on the part of 
the work force to improve its skill level. Output is produced 
by means of human capital (rather than pure labour) and 
physical capital. With diminishing returns, the rate of growth 
of capital adjusts to the rate of growth of human capital, but 
the latter rate of growth is now determined endogenously 
by the model. As before, the household sector's description 
remains unaltered and the demand rate of growth is given 
by Proposition 2.33 Denoting the aggregate level of human 
capital by /I, the production function is written as 
Y = AK0(UH)L~0H'F (25) 
where u represents the share of "human capital time" devoted 
to the production of the final good and H 7 an Arrow type 
33The rate of growth of labour being zero, c = C. 
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spillover or external effect generated by the aggregate level 
of human capital existing in society. A fraction (1 - u) of 
labour time is devoted to the accumulation of human capital 
according to the technology 
H = 6( 1 - u)H, (26) 
where 6 is a positive constant. This sector, which produces 
changes in the stock of human capital, will be referred to as 
the H-sector. 
An important similarity between Rebelo's model of the 
last section and Lucas' is the existence of the indecompos-
able subsector H determining the change in H. However, 
Lucas' model has two additional features, viz., a second en-
dogenously accumulable factor K and the external effect IP. 
As is to be expected, the external effect will give rise to a 
divergence between the market solution and the solution for 
the command economy. While an extremely lucid but rigor-
ous mathematical derivation of the results to follow may be 
found in Lucas (1988), an attempt will be made here to derive 
them exclusively with the help of Rebelo-type economic argu-
ments by arguing in terms of implicit prices of commodities 
for which explicit markets are absent. 
First, ( 25) may be rewritten 
Y = AK^uHH^)1-^ (27) 
so that steady state growth involves 
K 1 - / 3 + 7 H 1 - / 3 + 7 
Sk = K = = - r j - 9 " - ( 2 8 ) 
where g a n d gh stand respectively for the rates of growth of 
physical and human capital. Also, ( 9) implies that gk = gc 
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in a steady state, where gc stands for the rate of growth of 
C -
It will be useful to concentrate on the market economy 
first. Denoting the (implicit) price of H relative to Y by p, 
efficient allocation of H between the two sectors requires that 
u be chosen to equate the the value of marginal contribution 
of H in the two sectors. This yields 
p 6 = (1 -/3)AK^H~0IP 
= ( 1 (29) 
Equation ( 29) may be differentiated to obtain 
P 
9p = ~ w p 
= P9k + (7 - P)9h 
_ ( 7 J M ] , 
~ \P + 1 - / 3 + 7 m 
~ \P + 1 - / 3 + 7 
7 9c-
1 - / 5 + 7 
The parallel ( 23) is 
(30) 
= ' +
 ( 3 1 ) 
where ry is the rate of interest on Y denominated loans. 
The nonzero change in p, i.e., j r j z ^ c can arise only in 
the presence of diminishing returns in the y-sector. Under 
the assumption of steady growth (i.e., when gk = ^zj?-Qh), 
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however, there is clearly no diminishing returns in the Lucas 
model.34 However, the market economy is unaware of this, 
for even along the steady state path it fails to internalize the 
external effect of / / 7 . As is to be expected, the effect is ab-
sent in a command economy. Thus, the supply rate of growth 
of C for the market economy is 
Qc\Tv) - 7 
Once again, the supply rate varies with the rate of interest 
and one expects demand parameters to start playing a role 
in determining the endogenous growth rate. Combining this 
with Proposition 2, the equilibrium rate of growth of C is 
, ( l - / ? + 7 )(*~P) , ,„, 
«= = ( 32 ) 
Finally, using ( 28), it follows that 
. (i - m - p ) c m 
9* - „ ( l - / J + 7 ) - 7 - ( 3 8 ) 
To the extent that 1 > u > 0, equation ( 26) implies that the 
maximum rate of growth of human capital possible in the 
Lucas model is given by p. 
The demand and supply curves as well as the equilibrium 
rates of interest and growth are depicted in Figure 3. The 
supply curve is drawn under the assumption of a positive 
externality. In case the latter is negative, the curve could be 
34In Rebelo this happened due to the presence of a nonreproducible 
factor. 
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downward sloping. 
A set of sufficient conditions for positive solutions to exist is 
(i) The slope of gsc(ry) > g*(ry), 
i.e., j z ^ < o\ and 
(ii) Intercept of g*(ry) on the ry axis > intercept of .^(r^), 
i.e., 6 > p. 
Going over to the command economy now, ^ is identically 
zero as explained earlier. A second difference arises from the 
planner's perception of the social marginal productivity of a 
unit of investment in human capital in the y-sector. With 
positive externality, it is now larger than the right hand side 
of ( 29) and equals 
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Q y 
= (1 - (5)AKpu~pH^ (34) 
d(uH) 
+7 A K ^ u H ) 1 - 1 3 ^ - 1 -
= + (35) 
The marginal productivity of H being times that 
in the market economy, the parallel of ( 31) for the planner 
is simply 
ry = 6{ )• (36) 
Figure <1: LUCAS- C o m m a n d Solu t ion 
This implies that the supply rate of growth curve is horizontal 
at the level of ry given by. ( 36). Denoting this rate of interest 
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by r*% the supply rate of growth curve is infinitely elastic at 
this rate. Plugging it into Proposition 2, 
+ (37) 
Finally, using ( 28), 
f ^ g ) . 08) 
The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 4. A sufficient condition 
for a positive solution to g** to exist now is that 
The same condition guarantees that g** is positive, provided 
that 1 - (3 + 7 > 0. 
Using the upper bound on gh, it follows from ( 28) that 
l-P • 
Imposing this bound on the value of g*c* and assuming that 
7 > 0, it follows that 
1 - f 3 p 
Finally, noting that 
(1 
9 <r(l-/3) 
and 
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9 c
 a ( l - / ? ) + ( a - l ) 7 ' 
it follows that a set of sufficient conditions for g** > g* is 
that 
7 > 0 and a > 1. 
Lucas' essential results are summarized as 
P R O P O S I T I O N 1 1 In a model of endogenous human cap-
ital formation along with accumulation of physical cap-
ital, the growth rate of the system is endogenously de-
termined by the parameters of the preference function 
and technology. Further, in the presence of a positive 
spillover effect generated by human capital formation, a 
mild restriction on the elasticity of marginal utility en-
sures that the rate of growth of the market economy is 
less than that of the command economy. 
Clearly, the rate of savings has a role to play now in deter-
mining the equilibrium rate of growth. There are two ways in 
which savings occurs in Lucas' model. First, it has the form 
of physical capital accumulation. This part of savings is no 
different from Solow's and does not have an effect on the rate 
of growth. But allocating labour away from the production 
of final goods for the sake of human capital accumulation also 
constitutes savings. It is this form of savings that determines 
the rate of growth. Rebelo (1991) builds on this model to 
make the technology for human capital generation dependent 
on physical as well as human capital. Thus, simultaneously 
with the allocation parameter u, he has another allocation 
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r 
parameter 4> determining the allocation of physical capital 
between the two sectors. This allows him to separate out, the 
two types of savings. Also, to the extent that both physi-
cal and human capital are used in the production of human 
capital, both types of savings behaviour now affect the equi-
librium rate of growth. It should be clear that the source of 
growth in this version of the Rebelo model is different from 
that in his linear model. 
3.4 Romer: Model l ing Research 
As with Lucas and Rebelo, the growth rate is traced back 
in Romer (1990) to a core sector unencumbered by dimin-
ishing returns.35 He questions, however, Lucas1 conclusion 
that there is an upper bound on an economy's achievable 
rate of growth. After all, an important moving force behind 
economic activity Is the desire to break through existing bar-
riers on growth rates. As opposed to Lucas therefore, who 
locates the source of economic growth in the accumulation of 
human capital (by means of human capital), Romer believes 
that growth is not an outcome of human capital accumula-
tion as such, but of the invention of increasingly productive 
techniques. Human capital is a sine qua lion for this activ-
ity insofar as it is a vitally important input (in the shape of 
research labour) into the inventive process. For a given stock 
of human capital, there is of course an upper bound on the 
achievable rate of growth in Romer also, but the bound itself 
is flexible upwards with a growth in this stock. To emphasise 
this fact, Romer assumes the stock of human capital to be at 
3SAs in Arrow (Case a < 1) and Lucas, but unlike Rebelo, the absence 
of diminishing returns is inseparable from the theory of technical progress 
offered by the model. 
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a constant level H over time.36 
Once again, the equilibrium rate of growth is found by 
equating the supply rate of growth to the demand rate. There 
is no change in the principles underlying the latter. The sup-
ply rate too is determined, as in Rebelo, by imposing two sep-
arate no arbitrage conditions. The first equates the marginal 
product of human capital in the production of final goods to 
the value of it in research. Since the stock of human capi-
tal is a constant, however, a no arbitrage condition involving 
loans in human capital denominated units is no longer valid. 
This condition is replaced by the requirement that the rate of 
return on investment in research is equal to the market rate 
of interest. 37 
The production function for final goods38 is chosen to be 
where Hy represents human capital employed in producing Y, 
x(i) the quantity of the ith variety of specialized input used in 
the production of Y and A the cardinality of a continuum of 
existing varieties. Specialized inputs are indexed according to 
the chronological order of their appearance. The proximate 
36In identifying the source of technical progress in purposive research. 
Romer is also offering a way out of the weakness of the Arrow model, 
which views technical progress as an inevitable byproduct of the process 
of capital accumulation. 
37In anticipation of what follows, it is worth pointing out that in order 
to make research an incentive compatible activity, a monopoly element 
has to be introduced into the model. This would ensure that the rate of 
interest is no longer equal to the marginal productivity of capital. 
3SFollowing an idea of Ethier (1982), the function is a reinterpretation 
of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) preference function for variety. 
(39) 
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object of research is the iih design or idea39, whose concrete 
embodiment, is the input x(i). Progress in research implies 
an increase in the value of A and along with it, an expansion 
in the size of the set of ideas as well as that of the set of 
specialized inputs. 
That ( 39) captures the notion of specialization may be 
appreciated from the following considerations. Assuming all 
x(iys to be used at the same level, say x, the production 
function reduces to 
Y = H«Axl-Q. (40) 
Given x, the marginal return to variety is measured by 
9 Y _ era l-a 
d A ~ H y X • 
In other words, there are -constant returns to variety, given 
the level of x{i). As opposed to this, the marginal return to 
an increase in x, given that variety is fixed at A, behaves as 
follows: 
H*A( 1 - a)x~a > 0 
H%A(-a)(l - a)®"""1 < 0. 
Thus, given A, there is decreasing returns to a mere increase 
in the quantity in which the different inputs are employed. 
In other words, specialization offsets the tendency for dimin-
ishing returns associated with an intensive use of existing 
inputs. 
3 9The two words "design" and "idea" will be used synonymously in what 
follows. 
dY_ 
dx 
d2Y 
dx2 
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The design underlying a specialized input is nonexclud-
able, since it can be copied relatively costlessly.40 This acts 
as a disincentive for research as a privately organized activ-
ity. Romer's model resolves the difficulty by adopting a m o 
nopolistically competitive market structure backed by patent 
laws. There are two ways in which an existing design may 
be utilised. First, it may be used to produce the specialized 
input based on it. Second, any idea can be utilized to cre-
ate newer ideas through further research. The patent laws in 
Romer inhibit free access to a design by a non-patent holder 
in the first of these activities. However, the laws do not pre-
clude the free use of an existing idea to churn out new ones. 
In other words, a patent accords to the product of invention 
the status of a partially excludable commodity. The total 
body of knowledge incorporated in the stock of existing ideas 
(of size A) is a free input into new research, but the use of 
each individual design is excludable in producing the corre-
sponding input. 
Romer's economy consists of three parts: a perfectly com-
petitive sector producing Y; for each i, a monopolist produc-
ing x(i); and a competitive sector producing research ideas 
or designs. Before proceeding further, it is of some help to 
present the social accounts of the Romer model in a schematic 
form: 
40It is also nonrival, since two production processes based on the same 
idea can be simultaneously operated. Unlike rival inputs, there is no sense 
in which the two processes can be viewed as employing two pieces of the 
same idea. Being both nonrival and non-excludable, a design has the 
required characteristics of a pure public good. 
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Soc ia l A c c o u n t s for t h e R o m e r M o d e l 
Sector Output Input Market St ructure 
Final Goods Y Bv,x(i),ic(0,Aj Competitive 
Intermediate 
Goods 
x(i), te(0, .4] K, i'h de-
sign, te(0, A] 
Monopoly 
Research A Ha, A Competitive 
Since Y is produced under perfect competition, the wages wljj 
of human capital in this sector equals its marginal product: 
rA 
wyH = oil"'1 J x(i)l~adi (41) 
Similarly, the inverse derived demand function for the in-
put. x(i) is 
p(i) = (l-a)H;x(i)-° (42) 
where p(i) is the price paid per unit use of 2(7'). 
The first no arbitrage condition requires that the right 
hand side of ( 41) be equal to the value of the marginal prod-
uct of human capital in research. To calculate the latter, the 
details of the research technology have to be specified along 
with the market structure. The production of x(i) may be 
thought of as a two stage (but not necessarily vertically inte-
grated) process. The lower stage consists of the creation of a 
design, i.e., the task of "hitting an idea". Human capital is 
an essential input in this process and calls forth a once for all 
payment to the inventor. At the higher stage, nonspecialized 
or raw capital (Solow's K) is converted to specialized x(i) by 
means of a fixed coefficient production function, each unit of 
x(i) requiring £ units of raw capital. 
The raw capital congealed in an x[i) is borrowed from 
the household sector. If an x(i) is infinitely lived, there is a 
variable interest cost per period to be incurred by its producer 
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for infinite time. Alternatively, x(i) could also be looked upon 
as a consumable input, reproduced in each period. In this 
case too, there is an infinite stream of interest payments. 41 
A patent holder of the ith idea is the monopolist supplier of 
x(i) who earns an infinite stream of profits. The discounted 
present value of this infinite stream is set against the once 
for all payment for the design to define the rate of return on 
investment in research. Potential monopolists compete for 
this return as soon as a new design makes its appearance. 
This raises the price of the design, driving the rate of return 
to equality with the market rate of interest. 
The per period profit of a monopoly producer of x(i) is 
given by 
ir(i) = p(i)x(i) - rCz(i), (43) 
where r is the (real) market rate of interest paid on the raw 
capital (x(i) borrowed from the households. Using ( 42), the 
maximization of ( 43) for each i yields an expression for p(i) 
that depends only on r for each i: 
p = p ( i ) = ~ - - (44) 1 — a v ' 
By the same logic, this is true for the value of x(i) too. It 
depends only on r. This may be indicated by x(r). The value 
of 7r(i) Is also dependent on r alone: 
r( ix =px - r(x - - x - r(x = apx. (45) 
1 — a 
41 The input x(i) does not undergo obsolescence in Romer. Given t.he 
nature of the production function, there will always be positive demand lor 
it by the competitive producers of Y. Young (1993) describes this aspect 
in terms of complementarity of inputs. Obsolescence related problems are 
recognized by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Young. 
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and the infinite stream of 7r, discounted at the market rate of 
interest, equals 
r°° . 7r 
/ e~rtTrdl = -
Jo r apx 
= - ( 4 6 ) r 
The technology for research is given by 
A = 6 AH A (47) 
where <5 is a positive constant and IIA the human capital 
employed in producing new ideas (i.e., .4). As already in-
dicated, this sector is perfectly competitive. Since the pro-
duction function is homogeneous of degree 2 in A and HA, 
payment of factors according to their marginal productivity 
will over-exhaust the output value. This is avoided however, 
A being a free input into the research process by the assump-
tion of partial excludability. There is thus no difficulty in 
paying HA according to its marginal productivity. Denoting 
the price of A by PA, the value of the marginal product of 
Ha is Pa&A. In order to apply the first no arbitrage condi-
tion then, it only remains to calculate Pa using the second no 
arbitrage condition. Since Pa is none other than the invest-
ment in research, the second no arbitrage condition implies 
that in equilibrium it equals the infinite stream of monopoly 
profits discounted at the market rate of interest, viz., ( 46). 
TTius, 
xl-
Wjj = 6Aa{\ - a)H° — (48) 
where wfi is the wages received by HA. By the no arbitrage 
requirement, wyH = wfj, imposing which 
H » = m 
Substituting ( 49) into ( 47), 
The last step in the derivation of the supply rate function is 
to identify it with ( 50). Going back to ( 39), at any fixed 
value of r, 
Y = Hy Ax (r) l - a 
= Hy Aa A1~ax(r)1~a 
= Hy Aa(Ax(r))l~Q 
1 -H°AaKl~a, (51) £ l - a V 
where, K = (Ax(r) is the aggregate value of raw capital 
embodied in the specialized inputs when the rate of interest 
is fixed at r. Clearly, ^ is fixed, given r. Using ( 51), the 
counterpart of ( 9) in Romer's model is 
f + (52) 
which means that at any given r, the rates of growth of A. C, 
K and Y are the same. Thus, ( 50) is equivalently rewritten 
a s 
( 5 3 ) 
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As with Rebclo, this is a declining function of r. 
r 
Fiyurc 5: FIOMER (1930) 
The equilibrium is shown in Figure 5. The diagram shows 
that a positive rate of growth is achievable in equilibrium 
only if H is large enough.42 Romer argues on the basis of 
this observation that a minimum size of the stock of human 
capital is a necessary precondition for growth. The difference 
between rich nations and the poor may be explainable there-
fore in terms of the differences in the size of human capital 
in these societies. 
42To be precise, the condition is <52(1 - a)H > p. 
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Finally, there would be a divergence between the social 
and private marginal products of x due to the facts that (i) 
the market economy will not internalize the intertemporal 
externality generated by the investment in x (an investment 
today raises productivity for all time to come) and (ii) a 
monopolistic equilibrium leads to a socially suboptimal allo-
cation of resources. 
Romer's findings may now be summarized. 
P R O P O S I T I O N 1 2 When technical progress assumes the form 
of specialized inputs into the productive process, the equi-
librium growth rate of an economy can be sustained by 
a coinbination of perfectly competitive and monopolis-
tically competitive markets, the latter backed by a legal 
structure recognizing patent rights. The rate of growth 
for the command economy is larger than that for a mar-
ket economy. 
3.5 Aghion and Howitt: Obsolescence 
Apart from its being in the nature of a public good, a further 
disincentive to research is the fact of obsolescence. Newer 
and more efficient techniques replace the old with the result 
that efforts devoted towards invention of better methods of 
production are negatively affected by the possibility of even 
better methods appearing in future. So long as a newly devel-
oped technique holds sway, however, monopoly profits can be 
enjoyed from its use. While Romer assumes that any special-
ized input, once invented, is used forever, Aghion and Howitt 
(1992) go to the other extreme and assume that a specialized 
input goes into extinction as soon as a newer variety appears. 
The cause behind replacement is the higher productivity of 
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new inputs.43 
The model, however, specifies the rate of increase in pro-
ductivity exogenously. As such, the rate of growth of produc-
t ivitv is not even a variable of the model. What is not known 
with certainty, however, is the arrival time of a new input. 
Thus, even though the growth potential of a new input is 
known exactly, it is possible to speak only in terms of an ex-
pected growth rate of the economy. The Aghion and Howitt 
exercise is geared towards a determination of the equilibrium 
value of this expected rate of growth. The model is entirely 
supply oriented, the demand rate of growth having no role to 
plav even in a trivial sense (as in Solow above, for example). 
Thus the model is not a full equilibrium model and the real 
rate of interest r is exogenously given. 
Time is denoted by the continuous variable r and inven-
tions by the discrete variable t. Thus, xt denotes the special-
ized input relevant for time interval t, xt+1 for interval 14-1. 
The length of any such interval is a stochastic variable. 
As in Romer", there are three sectors of production, the 
final good sector, the intermediate good sector and the re-
search sector. The final good is produced according to 
Y = AF(x), (54) 
where A is a productivity parameter whose level is deter-
mined by the type of x in use.44 Thus, xt is associated with 
Au xt+i with At+1, and so on. Further, At+1 = 7Au 7 > 1, 
where 7 is a nonstochastic variable. If successive generations 
" T h e y also consider the possibility of simultaneous use of different va-
rieties. In this context, see Young (1993) also. In Rorner, the productivity 
differentia] is absent. 
"Produc t ion of Y requires unskilled labour also, but this is a constant 
and hence ignored. 
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of the inputs were to be available in a deterministic chrono-
logical sequence, the economy's growth rate would be fairly 
transparent. However, as noted already, this is not the case, 
the arrival time of a new input being a stochastic variable. 
The entire quantum of Y is consumed so that there is no 
direct savings out of Y. Nevertheless, savings enters through 
the back door since the level of Y depends on that of x and 
the latter is determined by the allocation of skilled labour 
to the production of x. The larger (smaller) the allocation 
in favour of z, the larger (smaller) Is current consumption. 
Thus, a decision to produce less of x amounts a decision to 
save more. 
The input x is produced by means of skilled labour but th? 
latter has a competitive use in research also. A fixed quantity 
N of skilled labour is allocated between these alternative uses. 
(In Romer, it is allocated between research and the final good 
The two activities will be described in turn and it Is sim-
pler to begin with x. Any x is produced by the linear tech-
nology: 
x = L. (55) 
As with Romer, each xt producer is a monopolist, so that 
the equilibrium condition for this sector is given by the equal-
ity of marginal cost (i.e., the wage rate wt expressed ^ V 
units) and revenue, viz., 
wt=At[F'(xt)+xtF"(xt)l (56) 
or, 
ut = [F'(xt)+xtF"(xt)]=u(xt), (57) 
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where u t stands for the productivity adjusted wage rate dur-
ing t. Combining with ( 56), the last equation can be written 
wt=AMN-nt). (58) 
By assumption, only one specialized input is in use at any 
time.* At each point of time, the equilibrium profit accruing 
to the monopolist producing xt is written 7r<, while Tv(u)t) [= 
7f(w(a*))] represents the optimal value of % as a function of 
u}t. As vh increases, the profit maximising value of xt falls, 
thus reducing the quantum of labour used in this sector. In 
Figure 4, the upward rising curve in the right hand panel 
shows the relationship ( 58) between wt and the amount of 
labour available for research, given that the optimum amount 
of xt is being produced. The intercept of the curve on the 
vertical axis is given by wt = AtQ{N). At, any wage rate 
below this, the entire N is devoted to producing xt. For 
later use, it, should be noted here that #(wt) is a (monotone 
decreasing) function of 
This completes the description of the x sector. Going 
over now to research, the interesting innovation of the pa-
per lies in treating the arrival time of new ideas, i.e., the 
output, of research, as a random variable. The-probability 
of success (in research) at any point of time is assumed to 
have a Poisson distribution with parameter A<£(n), where <$> 
is a linear function of n {<*>' > 0), the labour devoted to re-
search at each point of time. There is perfect competition 
in the research sector and Vt+1 is the price of the t + l11 in-
novation, i.e., the idea behind the specialized input xt+\. A 
firm engaged in producing this idea faces a probability Xcp of 
success at any r, so that 1 - Ad is the probability that the 
innovation does not occur. In case of success, the revenue 
56 
earned is otherwise the revenue is zero. In either case, 
however, it has to incur a wage cost equal to wtnt45 Thus. 
\<j>(nt)Vt+1 + (1 - X<f>(nt)).0 = Vt+1\(j}(nt) stands for the ex-
pected revenue and wtnt for the deterministic cost at each 
r in t. Hence, the objective function of a firm engaged in 
research is given by: 
Vt+lW(nt) - wtnt. (59) 
As before, there are two no arbitrage conditions relevant 
for the determination of the (expected) supply rate of growth. 
First, at each r in t, the wage rate wt in the monopoly sector 
must equal the wage rate in the research sector. The second 
no arbitrage condition states that the investment Vt+i made 
by a potential monopolist 'in buying the output of research 
must yield a rate of return equal to the market rate of interest 
r. 
The research sector being competitive, the wage rate of 
research labour equals the expected value of its marginal 
product.46 Thus, the first of the no arbitrage conditions 
yields 
wt = Vt+i\(j>'(nt). (60) 
In order to formalise the second no arbitrage condition, the 
stream of expected returns associated with an investment 
VtJr\ has to be identified. This depends on the expected length 
4SIt is worth emphasising that nt s tands for labor engaged in producing 
the t + l"1 innovation. 
w T h e wage rate in this sector has to be interpreted in the sense of an 
imputed value, since the actual payment is held up till the research bears 
frui t . A capital market structure that sustains the process is described 
later. 
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of the interval t + 1 for which * t + 1 yields returns and this in 
turn depends on n , + l l the labour engaged in inventing 
Thus, the expected return at any r in t + 1 is e 
= e - U n ^ r ^ N - „1+1)), since 7tf+1 must correspond to 
the optimum value of profit at r . Consequently, the dis-
counted present value of this expected stream is 
yt i = f°° e-rre-mnt+x)rAt+1jt(Cj{N ~ Th+l))dT 
+ JO 
AJ+IIR(Q(N - TH+I)) ( 61 ) 
r + \<i>(nt+i) 
Putting ( 60) and ( 61) together, 
.. .At+i*(u)(N-nt+\)) f62) 
wt = \<t>(rH)- r + X(Knt+i) 
Definition of Equilibrium 
An equilibrium solution path for research is a sequence 
| n f } j t = 112,3, . . . such that each successive pair {m , ru+i) satisfies ( 6*2). 
For every (expected) value of n m , ( 62) gives the value of 
wt required to satisfy the first no arbitrage condition. Plug-
ging this into ( 56), one gets n*, the allocation of labour into 
research at each r during t.47 Since, * is monotone decreas-
ing in u>, a rise in n<+i reduces wt and hence n*. The relation 
47The maximum may not be interior, in which case ( 62) does not hold 
as an equality. 
58 
between nt and nt+i is captured by Figures 6 and 7. 
A | W|N-II|) 
r i g u r c G: AGI I ION-HOWITT 
Figure 5 gives a fixed point for the problem, with the same 
level of equilibrium n in all periods. 
Denoting the right hand side of ( 62) by h(nt+1), a pos-
sibility of zero research is shown by the brokrn curve in 
the left hand panel of Figure 6. This happens only when 
h(0) < Atu(N). 
An interesting feature of the model arises from the fact 
that research produces a revenue only when its output, say, 
the t + innovation, actually arrives. Prior to that point 
of time, research labour cannot be paid for from the value of 
its produce. The problem may be resolved by assuming that 
the monopoly firm producing 2rt+i is owned by the labourers 
producing the t + l f / l idea. They are paid in terms of shares 
in the profits of their firm once the innovation is success-
ful. The discounted present value of their expected earning 
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would then be V'f+1. This is exactly the same as their ex-
pected wage earnings during the interval t as labourers m 
the research firm. This may be seen as follows. Had they 
been actually paid their wages, the earnings at each r m t 
would be W W , since \<f>M is linear and the research 
sector Is perfectly competitive. The probability of success m 
each "trial" being A^fa), the expected length of the interval 
t is } ,. Thus, the wages expected to be earned during the 
entire interval t is [ j ^ l ^ + i ' V M = Vt+1-
Figure 7: AG! I10N-H0WITT 
The question nevertheless remains as to how the research 
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labour n* is actually sustained during t, since the wages can-
not be paid. One must assume then that there is a source of 
finance for research labour which is replenished later as soon 
as the innovation is successful. One can also try and add a 
market for loans to remove the lacuna. Aghion and Howitt 
compute the expected growth rate and its variance for the 
case where a fixed point h exists as in Figure 7. They are 
respectively given by \(j>{h)ln^ and \c?(h)(ln~f)2. 
Although the rate of growth is supply determined, it is 
amenable to policy manipulations. In particular, since the 
rate of interest r is exogenous to the model, it is possible to 
think of it as a policy instrument and carry out comparative 
statics exercises with respect to its variations. In particular, 
following the arguments developed, it is not hard to see that 
the fixed point n must fall with a rise in the rate of interest. 
With a rise in r, the value of marginal product of research 
labour falls. This causes the wage rate consistent with equi-
librium allocation to fall and hence the profit maximising 
employment in the x sector to rise. Consequently, research 
employment falls. 
As opposed to the previous models, a social optimum may 
involve a lower rate of growth than the market equilibrium. 
This happens because in a market economy, researchers do 
not internalize the negative effect of inventions on existing 
profits. 
Thus, the major results of Aghion and Howitt may be 
summed up as follows: 
P R O P O S I T I O N 1 3 In the presence of obsolescence, the ar-
rival of more productive inputs has a depressing effect on 
the rate of private investment into research. The growth 
rate of the economy is a stochastic variable and the ex-
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pectcd rate of growth of a market economy might exceed 
that of the command economy. since the latter internal-
izes the destructive effect of the arrival of new ideas on 
existing productive processes. 
3.6 Barro: Publ ic Sector and t h e Role of In-
frastructure 
It has often been claimed that inadequate infrastructure con-
stitutes a serious constraint on growth. Barro (1990) can be 
viewed as an attempt to capture this problem. The resulting 
model leads back to a demand driven growth rate, the supply 
rate playing no role at all. 
The two arguments in the production function are now 
capital and a public sector input. The latter is in the nature 
of a public consumption item of national accounts, entering 
both as a factor payment on the cost side and a value added 
item on the revenue side. Denoting this by G, the production 
function is 
Y = F(K,G). (63) 
It has all the properties of the Solow production function. 
The public sector input is financed by a proportional in-
come tax r , i.e., 
TY = G. (64) 
Since.( 63) reduces to ( 8), where y = g and k = § , equation 
( 64) fixes k once r is given. This in turn fixes f'(k) and hence 
the rate of growth via Proposition 2. 
The problem then reduces to a choice of the optimal r 
and Barro goes on to compare the welfare maximizing r with 
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the growth rate maximizing r and shows that in genera], the 
two may well be unequal. 
A divergence arises between the social and the market 
equilibrium once again since in calculating the marginal prod-
uct of capital, the market fails to take note of the proportion-
ate relationship between K and G on account of a given r. 
As a result, the command economy will grow at a higher rate 
than the market economy. 
The essential features of Barro's conclusions are: 
P R O P O S I T I O N 1 4 When the government taxes private sec-
tor income and transfers the proceeds entirely in the 
form of infra structural support, the endogenous rate of 
growth of the economy is a function of the tax rate. The 
growth maximizing tax rate may fall short of the welfare 
maximizing one. The command econmy choses a higher 
growth rate than the market economy for any given tax 
rate. 
4 Conclusion 
As an economist from third world, I am naturally interested 
in models of growth and development. The important ques-
tion to me therefore is whether some of the models covered 
here have a bearing on the everyday problems which concern 
us. Or at least, whether these models might be made to fo-
cus on a few of these issues. A belief shared by many policy 
planners saddled with a low level growth trap is that the 
panacea lies in an increase in the savings rate. Such a view-
point suggests that there is no immediate prospect of capital 
saturation, as in the core sector of Rebelo;s model. However, 
for this to be true, it must also be the case that the process 
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of capital accumulation can itself reverse all tendencies for 
diminishing returns. If so, the capital in question cannot be 
a simple one-to-one transformation of savings as in Solow. 
Rebelo's explanation lies in identifying a part of it as human 
capital. A message from NGT that is relevant for develop-
ing economies then, is that a mere effort to raise the saving 
rate is not going to be of help. One must at the same time 
be able to transform savings into increasingly sophisticated 
capital "equipment". 
On the negative side, a crucial policy problem facing a 
society such as ours is that of unemployment. A perceptive 
reader would have noticed that the entire literature on NGT 
is based on the assumption of full employment. Given its 
concern for steady states, this is perhaps a natural assump-
tion to make. But the nagging question then is whether an 
excessive concern with maintainable long term growth rates 
is the real issue for developing economies. In my opinion, a 
model of endogenous growth with unemployment would be a 
welcome addition to the existing literature. 
There are other issues of contemporary interest. For ex-
ample, developed economies are becoming increasingly con-
scious of the trade-off between growth and environmental 
quality. Is growth necessarily a desirable objective? The 
question, that arises here is whether a developing economy 
can afford the luxury of a low growth rate in pursuit of a 
better environment. Going by the example of India, higher 
growth rates are taken to be indices of successful government 
policy. It seems unlikely that a government with a concern for 
environment at the cost of growth would have the sympathy 
of the electorate. There is an increasing body of literature on 
growth and environment that is of interest in this connection. 
It could not be covered here given the limited purpose of the 
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paper. 
The paper is dedicated to a great teacher. It is best 
viewed, therefore, as an aid to teaching. It contains no new 
results at all, but it offers a simple way of consolidating ex-
isting results. One hopes that the scheme would be of help 
to those who wish to get acquainted with the essential ideas 
before plunging into a detailed study of the subject. 
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6 Append ix 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
67 
The path of optimal consumption and savings is obtained by 
maximizing ( 4) subject to ( 5). The problem is solved by 
maximizing the current value Hamiltonian 
H(K(t),c(t)Mt)) = m ^ ( c i t y - ° - i ) M t M t ) m 
+w(t)L(t)-L(t)c(i)} (A- 1) 
at each t with respect to c(t). Dropping the t's for notational 
convenience, this yields48 
c~° = i). (A-2) 
At the same time, the costate variable r] is required to satisfy 
the condition 
t) = -T]r -t- r]6 (A. 3) 
Differentiating ( A. 2) logarithmically, 
5 = (A. 4) 
77 C. 
4SIt is being assumed that the optimal path is interior. There is no 
loss of generality here, since the assumption is fulfilled in a steady state . 
Also, the model permits the household to bring down the capital stock 
by consuming it away. In steady state, no such consumption will actually 
take place. A constant fraction of the capital stock could be assumed to 
undergo physical depreciation at each t also. However, this does not add 
any analytical insight and is avoided for notational simplicity. 
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'Writing gd = f , equations ( A. 3) and ( A. 4) imply 
r = 6 + agd. (A. 5) 
Thus, 
d/ \ r ~ <5 ^ = < ? > ) = ——. ( A 6 ) 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6. 
Plugging ( 15) in ( 11), the value of k* is seen to satisfy 
1 — a 
The solution for the command economy is found by writ-
ing the Hamiltonian as 
H(K(t) , c(t), 9{t)) = L(t) — ( c ( t ) 1 — - 1 ) 
1 — <7 
(A. 7) 
Equation ( A. 4) stays unchanged, except for the replacement 
of 77 by 0. Equation ( A. 3) transforms to 
' = - M + S e 
= + (1 - a)f'(k)} + 89. (A. 8) 
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As with Proposition 5, it is easily seen that the equilibrium 
rate of growth g" for the command economy is still given by 
(15). Equation ( A. 8) then implies 
[oM + (1 - a)f'(k)) = a-c+6 
= J ^ L a + 6. (A. 9) 
1 - a 
Denoting the solution of ( A. 9) by fc", and noting that as-
sumption FU < 0 => ^ > / '(*) V- A:, the result follows 
from a comparison of the solution for k** with that for k . 
Q.E.D. 
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